Quantum-Resistant Identity-Based Signature with Message Recovery and Proxy Delegation by Lu, Xiuhua et al.
symmetryS S
Article
Quantum-Resistant Identity-Based Signature with
Message Recovery and Proxy Delegation
Xiuhua Lu 1,2 , Qiaoyan Wen 1, Wei Yin 1, Kaitai Liang 3, Zhengping Jin 1,
Emmanouil Panaousis 4 and Jiageng Chen 5,6,*
1 State Key Laboratory of Networking and Switching Technology, Beijing University of Posts and
Telecommunications, Beijing 100876, China; luxiuhua2015@163.com (X.L.); wqy@bupt.edu.cn (Q.W.);
yinwei24005@bupt.edu.cn (W.Y.); zhpjin@bupt.edu.cn (Z.J.)
2 Faculty of Mathematics and Information Science, Langfang Normal University, Langfang 065000, China
3 Department of Computer Science, University of Surrey, Guildford GU2 7XH, UK; k.liang@surrey.ac.uk
4 Surrey Centre of Cyber Security, University of Surrey, Guildford GU2 7XH, UK; e.panaousis@surrey.ac.uk
5 School of Computer Science, Central China Normal University, Wuhan 430079, China
6 Central China Normal University Wollongong Joint Institute, Central China Normal University,
Wuhan 430079, China
* Correspondence: chinkako@gmail.com
Received: 12 January 2019; Accepted: 17 February 2019; Published: 20 February 2019


Abstract: Digital signature with proxy delegation, which is a secure ownership enforcement tool,
allows an original signer to delegate signature rights to a third party called proxy, so that the proxy can
sign messages on behalf of the original signer. Many real-world applications make use of this secure
mechanism, e.g., digital property transfer. A traditional digital signature mechanism is required to
bind a message and its signature together for verification. This may yield extra cost in bandwidth
while the sizes of message and signature are relatively huge. Message recovery signature, enabling
to reduce the cost of bandwidth, embeds a message into the corresponding signature; therefore,
only the signature will be transmitted to the verifier and the message can further be recovered from
the signature. In this paper, we, for the first time, propose a novel digital signature scheme in the
identity-based context with proxy delegation and message recovery features and, more importantly,
our scheme is quantum resistant, in a particular lattice-based signature. Our scheme achieves
delegation information and signature existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen warrant
and identity. Compared with the seminal lattice-based message recovery signature, our scheme is
independent from public key infrastructure, realizes delegation transfer of signature rights, and
compresses signature length ulteriorly. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first of its type.
Keywords: quantum resistant; lattice-based; proxy delegation; message recovery; small integer
solution problem; learning with errors; compression
1. Introduction
Digital signature aims at message authenticity, which can be verified by everyone with a
message/signature pair. Considering the practical application, a digital signature also needs to
have special properties for special functionality requirements, such as signature with delegation
functionality—proxy signature. Proxy signature, which was first proposed by Mambo [1], allows an
original signer to delegate his signing right to a proxy signer, so that the proxy signer can sign a message
on behalf of the original signer. Proxy signature is suitable for the case where the original signer is
temporarily absent so that the proxy is delegated to make a signature on behalf of the original signer. It
has many real-world applications (e.g., digital property transfer) and practical variants in the literature
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(e.g., [2]). We note that there have been some research works by far related to proxy delegation, such
as [3–9], in which they focus on decryption delegation. This paper deals with signature delegation.
Message recovery signature is a kind of digital signature with message recovery property, and
was first proposed by Nyberg and Rueppel in [10]. Compared with the traditional digital signature, a
message can be embedded into the signature. As a result, only the signature itself is required in the
verification stage instead of the message and signature pair in the traditional version. It reduces the
amount of information to be transmitted, and thus can save the transmission bandwidth dramatically.
Combining a message recovery signature and a proxy signature, a proxy signature with message
recovery emerges, which owns a hidden message and the functionality of signing right delegation
transfer. Furthermore, in order to simplify key management, Singh [11] combined identity-based
signature with proxy signature with message recovery, and introduced the concept of identity-based
proxy signature scheme with message recovery. Such scheme can work without the existence of public
key infrastructure, and the legitimacy of the user’s public key is not required to be verified.
1.1. Related Work
Many researchers have paid attention to proxy signature with message recovery, and a lot of
contributions [12–16] have been proposed in the literature. The schemes introduced in [12,13,15,16] are
based on a discrete logarithm problem, the one proposed in [14] is based on a decisional Diffie–Hellman
problem and a computational Diffie-Hellman problem. However, all these problems are solvable with
a quantum computer [17], so that security of schemes [12–16] will be unreliable in the quantum era,
and it is significant to construct a quantum-resistible proxy signature with message recovery.
Lattice-based cryptography is an excellent branch of post-quantum cryptography. For almost two
decades, lattice-based cryptography has been on the fast track of development. Some unsolved
questions in traditional cryptography, such as construction of a fully homomorphic encryption
scheme [18], have found their realization in lattice-based cryptography. Due to a reliable security
guarantee and powerful functionality, lattice-based cryptography becomes the preferred tool for our
topic—an identity-based proxy signature scheme with message recovery.
Lattice signature is the building foundation of our topic. In 2008, Gentry et al. [19] designed
the first provably secure lattice signature scheme. In 2012, Micciancio et al. [20] proposed a new
trapdoor generation algorithm and gave a lattice signature scheme with better efficiency and security.
In the same year, Lyubashevsky [21] gave a lattice signature scheme with better efficiency following a
special lattice with simpler computations. In 2014, Bai et al. [22] proposed an improved compression
technique for lattice signature in [21]. Lattice signatures in [19,20] and [21,22] are two main frames for
lattice signature schemes, and the latter is with better performance.
Lattice signature schemes [19–22] are all basic signature schemes. We will consider message
recovery and delegation of signing right in identity-based environment. In 2013, Tian et al. [23]
proposed lattice-based message recovery signature scheme following [21]. His scheme is based on
public key infrastructure without expressing delegation of signing rights. In 2016, Wang Li [24]
proposed an identity-based proxy signature scheme in lattice, which follows the idea of [19] and
doesn’t hide messages. In 2017, Faguo Wu et al. [25] gave a lattice proxy signature with message
recovery based on public key infrastructure.
1.2. Our Contribution
In this paper, we build an efficient and secure identity-based proxy signature scheme with
message recovery in lattice-based cryptography. Our scheme is based on the lattice signature without
trapdoors [21]. Inspired by the signature compression technique in [22], we introduce the random
error matrix Eid with enough small entries, let (A|I)
(
Sid
Eid
)
= ASid + Eid = H1(id). According
to the learning with errors problem, we keep Sid instead of (Sid, Eid), as the secret key of user id.
Correspondingly, the signature is Sidc + y rather than (Sidc + y, Eidc + y) in our scheme. These
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operations add more randomness to user secret key extraction, and reduce signature length with
Eidc + y.
For proxy signature, we change the traditional idea that the original signer generates the delegated
secret key and passes it to the proxy signer through the secure channel. Following the idea of two-party
signature in [26], our delegated secret key is obtained with the help of proxy signer’s secret key and
original signer’s public delegation information. Therefore, delegated secret key extraction is controlled
by the proxy signer and original signer, and no secure channel is required between them. Moreover,
anyone can verify the validity of delegation information because it is public.
Speaking of message recovery, we adopt the technique in [23]. Compared with the scheme in [23],
our scheme takes the following three advantages. Firstly, our scheme is identity-based and does not
rely on public key infrastructure maintenance. Secondly, our scheme realizes delegation transfer of
signing rights. Thirdly, our scheme condenses signature length. The comparing details of two schemes
are described in Section 5.
In addition, we divide the security definition in [11] into two factors: delegation information
existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen warrant and identity, signature existential
unforgeability against adaptive chosen message and identity. The former guarantees delegation
information is credible, and the latter guarantees that proxy signature is credible. Our security
definition is more comprehensive.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We present an overview of background knowledge
in Section 2. Then, we propose our model and security definitions for an identity-based proxy signature
scheme with message recovery in Section 3. In Section 4, we provide the identity-based proxy signature
scheme with message recovery in lattice-based cryptography. Correctness, security, and performance
analysis are discussed in Section 5. Finally, we conclude this paper in Section 6.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Notations
Z is the set of integers, and N is the set of natural numbers. Let q be a polynomial-size prime
number, Zq is the set of integers in (−q/2, q/2]. For a ∈ Z and d ∈ N, [a]2d ∈ (−2d−1, 2d−1] is the
unique integer satisfying a ≡ [a]2d
(
mod2d
)
, bade = (a− [a]2d)/2d. For e ∈ Zm, e(i) is the i-th entry
of e, ‖e‖ = ‖e‖2 =
√
m
∑
i=1
e2
(i) is the Euclidean norm of e, and ‖e‖∞ = max1≤i≤m
∣∣∣e(i)∣∣∣. For matrix
T ∈ Zm×n, T(i, j) is the entry in i-th row and j-th column, ‖T‖ is the largest Euclidean norm of its
column vectors, and T˜ is its Gram–Schmidt orthogonalization. If s1 and s2 are two bit strings, s1||s2 is
their concatenation, s1 ⊕ s2 is the result of xor computation. In addition, |s1|l1 is the prefix of s1 with
length l1, |s1|l2 is the suffix of s1 with length l2.
2.2. Lattice Theory
In this subsection, basic concepts and major algorithms related to our scheme are illustrated.
For readers who are interested in details, please see literature [19,27,28].
Definition 1. Algorithm TrapGen(q, m), with m ≥ 5n log q, outputs a pair (A, T)which satisfies the following
conditions: 1. A ∈ Zn×mq follows uniform distribution with overwhelming probability; 2. T ∈ Zm×m,
||T|| ≤ O(n log q) and ||T˜|| ≤ O(√n log q) 3. AT = 0(modq)
Definition 2. Dσ is a discrete Gaussian distribution on Z, with center 0 and standard deviation σ. Dm×nσ is a
matrix with m rows and n columns, and every entry in the matrix follows the distribution Dσ.
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Definition 3. For A ∈ Zn×mq , a short basis T of Λ⊥q (A), u ∈ Znq , and Gaussian parameter σ ≥
∥∥T˜∥∥ ·
ω
(√
log m
)
, algorithm SamplePre(A, T, u, σ) outputs some e ∈ Zm such that ||e|| ≤ σ√m and Ae =
u (modq).
Definition 4. Given a uniform random matrix A ∈ Zn×mq , the small integer solution (SIS) problem is to find a
short vector v ∈ Zm, such that Av = 0 (modq) and ||v|| ≤ β for some appropriate parameter β.
Definition 5. Given a pair
(
A, A>s + e
)
, where A ∈ Zn×mq follows uniform distribution with overwhelming
probability, s← Dnσ, e← Dmσ for appropriate parameter σ, the learning with errors (LWE) problem is to find s.
With appropriate parameters, LWE and SIS problems are notably hard average problems in lattice
theory, and they are the security basis of most cryptographic systems in lattice.
3. Identity-Based Proxy Signature with Message Recovery
Our model and security definitions for an identity-based proxy signature scheme with message
recovery (IDPSWM) come from the literature [11], and two adjustments are made.
• In our model, the delegation information is public, everyone may verify its legality; whereas,
in [11], the delegation information is sent to the proxy signer secretly, and only the proxy signer can
verify its legality. Therefore, a secure channel is unnecessary to transmit delegation information in
our model, and every user can verify delegation information legality.
• To make it easier to understand, we divide scheme security into two factors: delegation
information existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen warrant and identity
(EUF-ID-CWA), signature existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen message and
identity (EUF-ID-CMA). EUF-ID-CWA security assures that delegation information is believable.
EUF-ID-CMA security assures that signature is believable.
3.1. Our Model
There are three types of users: the original signer, the proxy signer, and the verifier, as well as a
private key generator (PKG) in the system; their roles are as follows:
• Setup (n): PKG inputs the security parameter n, outputs system public parameters params and
the system secret master key msk.
• KeyExtract (msk, id): Given an identity id, PKG makes use of the system secret master key msk
and provides the secret key skid for the identity id.
• DelGen (skidO , idP, w): The original signer idO inputs his secret key skidO , and the warrant w
associated with proxy signer idP, computes the delegation WO→P, and publishes delegation
information dg = (idO, idP, w, WO→P) to all system users.
• DelVer (dg = (idO, idP, w, WO→P)): For arbitrary system users, he verifies the legality of
delegation information dg = (idO, idP, w, WO→P). If it is legal, the output is 1, the delegation is
accepted; otherwise, the output is 0, and the delegation is rejected.
• PkeyGen (skidP , dg = (idO, idP, w, WO→P)): The proxy signer idP verifies whether the delegation
information dg = (idO, idP, w, WO→P) is valid. If it is invalid, he rejects this delegation. Otherwise,
he inputs his secret key skidP and the delegation information dg = (idO, idP, w, WO→P), outputs
the delegated secret key skO,P,w.
• PSign (skO,P,w,v): The proxy signer idP inputs his delegated secret key skO,P,w and the message
v, outputs the proxy signature ς.
• PVer (dg = (idO, idP, w, WO→P), ς): For arbitrary system users, he first recovers the message v
associated with signature ς, and then verifies the legality of the message/ signature pair (v, ς)
with regard to dg = (idO, idP, w, WO→P). If it is legal, the output is 1, the message is accepted;
otherwise, the output is 0, and the message is rejected.
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As to scheme correctness, seven algorithms should satisfy the following rules: For every security
parameter n, (params, msk) ← Setup (n), skid ← KeyExtract (msk, id), dg = (idO, idP, w, WO→P) ←
DelGen
(
skidO , idP, w
)
, skO,P,w← PkeyGen
(
skidP , dg = (idO, idP, w, WO→P)
)
, ς ← PSign (skO,P,w,v),
the probability of 1← PVer (dg = (idO, idP, w, WO→P), ς) is overwhelming.
3.2. Security Definitions
Scheme security includes two factors: delegation information existential unforgeability against
adaptive chosen warrant and identity (EUF-ID-CWA), signature existential unforgeability against
adaptive chosen message and identity (EUF-ID-CMA).
3.2.1. EUF-ID-CWA
EUF-ID-CWA security is described by the next game between a challenger C and a forger F .
• Initial Phase: The challenger C runs Setup algorithm to get system public parameters params and
the system secret master key msk. C returns params to the forger F and keeps msk himself.
• Query Phase: The forger F makes the following queries adaptively with a polynomial bounded
number, and the challenger C has the obligation to make reasonable answers.
1. KeyExtract (id): F selects a user identity id, sends it to the challenger C. C invokes algorithm
KeyExtract (msk, id) to get the associated secret key skid. Then, C returns skid to F .
2. DelGen (idO, idP, w): F selects the original signer idO, the proxy signer idP, and the warrant w,
and sends all of them to the challenger C. C executes KeyExtract (idO) query to get the associated
secret key skidO , and then invokes algorithm DelGen(skidO , idp, w) to get WO→P and returns it
to F .
• Forge Phase: The forger F gives his forgery (dg = (idO, idP, w, WO→P)). If the following
conditions are satisfied: DelVer
(
dg = (idO, idP, w, WO→P)
)
= 1, idO doesn’t occur in the
KeyExtract query, (idO, idP, w) doesn’t occur in the DelGen query, and his attack is successful.
Let ε1 be the success probability of F in this game.
Definition 6. An identity-based proxy signature scheme with message recovery (IDPSWM) is delegation
information existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen warrant and identity (EUF-ID-CWA), if for every
polynomial time forger F , ε1 is negligible.
3.2.2. EUF-ID-CMA
EUF-ID-CMA security is demonstrated by the following game between a challenger C and a
forger F .
• Initial Phase: The challenger C runs the Setup algorithm to get system public parameters params
and the system secret master key msk. C returns params to the forger F and keeps msk secret.
• Query Phase: The forger F executes the following queries adaptively with a polynomial bounded
number, and the challenger C has to return reasonable answers.
1. KeyExtract (id): F selects a user identity id and sends it to the challenger C. C invokes algorithm
KeyExtract (msk, id) to get secret key skid. Then, C returns skid to F .
2.DelGen(idO, idp, w): F selects the original signer idO, the proxy signer idP, and the warrant w,
submits them to the challenger C. C executes KeyExtract(id0) query to get the associated secret
skidO , and then invokes algorithm DelGen(skidO , idp, w) to get WO→P and returns it to F .
3. PkeyGen(dg = (idO, idP, w, WO→P)): F sends the delegation information dg =
(idO, idP, w, WO→P) to the challenger C. C verifies its validity firstly. If it isn’t valid, he refuses to
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respond. Otherwise, C executes a KeyExtract (idP) query to get secret key skidP , invokes algorithm
PkeyGen
(
skidP , dg = (idO, idP, w, WO→P)
)
to get delegated secret key skO,P,w and returns it to F .
4. PSign
(
dg = (idO, idP, w, WO→P),v
)
: F submits dg = (idO, idp, w, WO→P) and message v to
the challenger C. C verifies the legality of dg = (idO, idp, w, WO→P). If it is illegal, C rejects
answering the query. Otherwise, he executes the PkeyGen(dg = (idO, idp, w, WO→P)) query to
get the delegated secret key skO,P,w, invokes algorithm PSign(skO,P,w,v) to get signature ς, and
returns it to F .
• Forge Phase: The forger F gives his forgery (dg = (idO, idP, w, WO→P), ς).
Recovering the message v from ς, if the following conditions hold:
PVer
(
dg = (idO, idP, w, WO→P), ς
)
= 1, dg = (idO, idP, w, WO→P) doesn’t occur in the PkeyGen
query,
(
dg = (idO, idP, w, WO→P),v
)
doesn’t occur in the PSign query, his attack is successful.
Let ε2 be the success probability of F in the game.
Definition 7. An identity-based proxy signature scheme with message recovery (IDPSWM) is signature
existentially unforgeable against the adaptive chosen message and identity (EUF-ID-CMA), if, for every
polynomial time forger F , ε2 is negligible.
4. Our Scheme
In this section, we introduce our identity-based proxy signature scheme with message recovery
from lattice assumption. Our scheme includes seven algorithms, which also can be seen from Figure 1.
Figure 1. Flow chart of our signature algorithm.
• Setup(n): Inputting the security parameter n, PKG works as follows:
1. Invoke TrapGen (q, m) algorithm to obtain a pair of matrices (A ∈ Zn×mq , T ∈ Zm×m).
2. Let H1 : {0, 1}∗ → Zn×nq be a secure hash function.
3. Let H2, H5 : {0, 1}∗ → {−1, 0, 1}n be secure hash functions, and the image Hamming weight is
not larger than λ1.
4. Let H3 : {0, 1}∗ → {−1, 0, 1}n×n be a secure hash function, and every column vector in the
image has a small Hamming weight bounded by λ2.
5. Let H4 : Znq → {0, 1}l1+l2 be a secure hash function, where l2 is also the length of message v.
6. Let F1 : {0, 1}l2 → {0, 1}l1 , F2 : {0, 1}l1 → {0, 1}l2 be encoding functions.
Finally, PKG outputs public parameters params=(A, H1, H2, H3,H4, H5, F1, F2) and the secret
master key msk = T.
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• KeyExtract (msk, id): Given an identity id ∈ {0, 1}∗, PKG works as follows:
1. Sample Eid ← Dn×nσ , such that |Eid (i, j)| ≤ 7σ for all i, j = 1, · · · , n. If |Eid (i, j)| > 7σ for some
i, j, Resample again. According to [22], the probability of |Eid (i, j)| > 7σ for some i, j is less than
1/30.
2. Invoke algorithm SamplePre(A, T, H1(id)− Eid, σ), provide Sid follows the distribution Dm×nσ ,
such that ASid = H1(id)− Eid.
3. Return skid =Sid as secret key for the identity id.
• DelGen (skidO , idP, w): The original signer idO inputs his secret key skidO = SidO , and the warrant
w ∈ {0, 1}∗ associated with proxy signer idP does the following steps:
1. Sample yw← U(DmB ), U(DmB ) is the uniform distribution on DB = [−B, B].
2. Let cw = H2 (Ayw (modq)d, w), zw = SidO · cw + yw.
3. Let ω = Azw − H1 (idO) · cw (modq). If
∣∣∣[ω(i)]2d ∣∣∣ > 2d−1 − 7λ1σ, go to the first step to
resample yw.
4. Return WO→P = (zw, cw) with probability min
(
DmB (zw)/
(
M ·DmB,SidO ·cw (zw)
)
, 1
)
, and publish
delegation information dg = (idO, idP, w, WO→P = (zw, cw)) to all users.
• DelVer (dg = (idO, idP, w, WO→P = (zw, cw))): For arbitrary users, he verifies the legality of
delegation information dg = (idO, idP, w, WO→P = (zw, cw)) as follows:
1. Compute ω = Azw − H1 (idO) · cw (modq).
2. If cw = H2 (bωed, w) and ‖zw‖∞ ≤ B, output 1 and accept this delegation. Otherwise, output 0
and reject it.
• PkeyGen (skidP , dg = (idO, idP, w, WO→P = (zw, cw))): the proxy signer idP inputs his secret key
skidP = SidP and the delegation information dg = (idO, idP, w, WO→P = (zw, cw)), computes
Lw = H3 (w, zw, cw) ∈ {−1, 0, 1}n×n, outputs skO,P,w = SidP · Lw ∈ Dm×nσ·√λ2 as the delegated
secret key.
• PSign(skO,P,w,v): the proxy signer idP inputs his delegated secret key skO,P,w = SidP · Lw, the
message v ∈ {0, 1}l2 , does the next steps.
1. Sample y← U(DmB ), compute c′ = H4 (bAy(modq)ed).
2. Let v′ = F1 (v) || (F2 (F1 (v))⊕v), c = c′ ⊕v′.
3. Compute c0 = H5 (c), z = SidP · Lw · c0 + y.
4. Let ω = Az− H1 (idP) · Lw · c0 (modq).
5. If
∣∣∣[ω(i)]2d ∣∣∣ > 2d−1 − 7λ1√λ2σ, go to the first step to resample y. Otherwise, return proxy
signature ς = (z, c) with probability min
(
DmB (z)/
(
M ·DmB,SidP Lwc0 (z)
)
, 1
)
• PVer (dg = (idO, idP, w, WO→P = (zw, cw)), ς = (z, c)): For arbitrary user, he verifies the proxy
signature with the next steps. Here, we think the legality of delegation information dg =
(idO, idP, w, WO→P = (zw, cw)) has already been verified.
1. Compute c′ = H4(bAz− H1 (idP) · Lw · H5 (c) (modq)de).
2. Compute v′ = c⊕ c′, v = |v′|l2 ⊕ F2
(
|v′|l1
)
.
3. If F1 (v) = |v′|l1and ‖z‖∞ < B, accept the signature and output 1; otherwise, output 0 and
reject the signature.
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5. Scheme Analysis
5.1. Parameter Setting
n is the system security parameter:
1. For the TrapGen(q, m) algorithm, q = poly (n), m = d6n log qe.
2. For the SamplePre (A, T, H1 (id)− Eid, σ) algorithm, σ = ω
(
(m log m)1/2
)
.
3. According to [22], λ1 satisfies 2λ1 ·
(
n
λ1
)
≥ 2128.
4. According to [23], l1 and l2 are all about 100.
5. According to [22], 2d ≥ 7λ1
√
λ2nσ, B = 14σ (m− 1)
√
λ1
√
λ2.
6. According to [21], M is a small constant of about 8.
5.2. Correctness of the Scheme
1. For DelVer(dg = (idO, idP, w, WO→P)) algorithm, WO→P = (zw, cw),
ω = Azw − H1 (idO) · cw (modq) = A
(
SidO · cw + yw
)−(
ASidO + EidO
) · cw (modq)
= ASidO · cw + Ayw − ASidO · cw − EidO · cw (modq)
= Ayw − EidO cw (modq) .
Because in step 3 of DelGen
(
skidO , idP, w
)
algorithm, we have:
If
∣∣∣[ω(i)]2d ∣∣∣ > 2d−1 − 7λ1σ, go to the first step to resample yw.
Therefore, bωde = bAyw − EidO cw (modq)ed= Ayw (modq)d, such that
cw = H2(bAyw(modq)ed, w)= H2 (bωde, w).
In addition, due to yw← DmB , and zw = SidO · cw + yw, zw follows uniform distribution on
[−B + γ, B− γ]m for γ = 14√λ1σ, so that ‖zw‖∞ ≤ B. So far, verification of delegation information
is correct.
2. For PVer(dg = (idO, idp, w, WO→P).ς = (z, c)) algorithm,
ω = Az− H1 (idP) · Lw · H5 (c) (modq) ,
= A
(
SidP · Lw · H5 (c) + y
)− (ASidP + EidP) · Lw · H5 (c) (modq) ,
= Ay− EidP · Lw · H5 (c) (modq) .
Because in step 5 of PSign(skO,P,w,v) algorithm, we have:
If
∣∣∣[ω(i)]2d ∣∣∣ > 2d−1 − 7λ1√λ2σ, go to the first step to resample y.
Therefore, bωed = bAy− EidP · Lw · H5(c)(modq)ed = bAy(modq)ed, such that
c′ = H4(bAz− H1(idP) · Lw · H5(c)(modq)ed)= H4(bAy(modq)ed)
Due to c = c′ ⊕ v′, we have v′ = c ⊕ c′. Since v′ = F1 (v) || (F2 (F1 (v))⊕v), the message
v = |v′|l2 ⊕ F2
(
|v′|l1
)
, and F1 (v) = |v′|l1 .
In addition, since y ← DmB , and z = SidP · Lw · H5 (c) + y, z follows uniform distribution on
[−B + γ, B− γ]m for γ = 14√λ1λ2σ, so that ‖z‖∞ ≤ B.
Up to now, proxy signature verification is successful. Combining two points, we draw a conclusion
that our scheme is correct.
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5.3. Security Analysis
Our scheme security consists of two parts: EUF-ID-CWA security aims at delegation information
reliability, EUF-ID-CMA security aims at proxy signature reliability.
5.3.1. EUF-ID-CWA Security
Theorem 1. Provided that the SIS problem is hard to solve, our identity-based proxy signature scheme with
message recovery (IDPSWM) is delegation information existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen warrant
and identity (EUF-ID-CWA).
Proof. We prove this theorem by contradiction. Assuming that a polynomial time forger F has the
ability to provide valid and fresh delegation information with some non-negligible probability ε1, we
can design an algorithm to solve an SIS instance with probability(
1/2 − 1/2128
) (
ε1 − 1/2128
) ((
ε1 − 1/2128
)
/(Q1 + Q2) − 1/2128
)
,
where Q1 and Q2 are the times of H2(wij) queries and DelGen
(
idi, idj, wij
)
queries.
That is to say, with an SIS problem instance (A|In) ∈ Zn×(m+n)q , C interacts with forger F to find
small non-zero vector e =
(
e1
e2
)
, e1 ∈ Zm and e2 ∈ Zn, such that (A|In) e = (A|In)
(
e1
e2
)
= Ae1 + e2 =
0 (modq). The details are as follows:
• Initial Phase: C selects F1 : {0, 1}l2 → {0, 1}l1 , F2 : {0, 1}l1 → {0, 1}l2 , submits A, F1, and F2 as
system parameters to the forger F .
• Query Phase: The forger F makes the following queries, C gives reasonable answers:
1. H1 (idi) query: F selects a user identity idi ∈ {0, 1}∗, sends it to C. C samples Sidi ← Dm×nσ ,
Eidi ← Dn×nσ , let H1 (idi) = ASidi + Eidi . He saves
(
idi, Sidi , ASidi + Eidi
)
in the listH1 and returns
H1 (idi) = ASidi + Eidi to F .
2. H2
(
wij
)
query: F selects warrant wij ∈ {0, 1}∗ associated with the original signer idi ∈ {0, 1}∗,
the proxy signer idj ∈ {0, 1}∗, sends all of them to C. C randomly samples cij ← {−1, 0, 1}n with
Hamming weight less than or equal to λ1, selects zij ← DmB uniformly, let ω = Azij − H1 (idi) ·
cij (modq). If some entry in ω is larger than 2d−1 − 7λ1σ, C resamples cij and zij again. Because
2d ≥ 7λ1
√
λ2nσ, the probability that every entry in ω is smaller than 2d−1 − 7λ1σ is larger than
1/3. At last, C saves (idi, idj, wij, cij, zij) in listH2 and returns cij to F .
3. KeyExtract (idi) query: F selects a user identity idi ∈ {o, 1}∗ and sends it to the challenger C. C
searches listH1 to get (idi, Didi , ASidi + Eidi ), and returns skidi = Sidi . If it doesn’t exist, C queries
H1 (idi) firstly.
4. DelGen
(
idi, idj, wij
)
query: F selects the original signer idi ∈ {0, 1}∗ , the proxy signer idj ∈
{0, 1}∗ , and the warrant wij ∈ {0, 1}∗, sends all of them to C. C looks list H2 for (idi, idj, wij, cij, zij)
and returns
(
zij, cij
)
. If (idi, idj, wij, cij, zij) doesn’t exist, C queries H2
(
wij
)
firstly.
• Forge Phase: The forger F gives his forgery (idi∗ , idj∗ , wij∗ , Wi∗→j∗ = (z∗, c∗)).
Because F queries H2(wij) at most Q1 times, queries DelGen
(
idi, idj, wij
)
at most Q2
times, so that the number of cij is at most Q1 + Q2. Suppose there are c1, c2, · · · ,
cQ1+Q2 . For Az
∗ − H1 (idi∗) c∗ (modq), the probability of F generates c∗ such that
c∗ = H2
(bAz∗ − H1 (idi∗) · c∗ (modq)ed, wij∗) is 1/(2128), which is negligible, so that
c∗∈{c1, c2, · · · , cQ1+Q2} with overwhelming probability 1− 1/(2128).
Because F gives a successful forgery with probability ε1, (idi∗ , idj∗ , wij∗ , Wi∗→j∗ = (z∗, c∗)) is a
valid forgery and c∗∈{c1, c2, · · · , cQ1+Q2} with probability ε1 − 1/2128. Supposing c∗ = ct, we further
conclude that it comes from a H2 query rather than a DelGen query.
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If c∗ = ct comes from DelGen
(
idit , idjt , wijt
)
query, then
c∗ = H2
(bAz∗ − H1 (idi∗) · c∗ (modq)ed, wij∗) = H2 (bAzt − H1 (idit) · c∗ (modq)ed, wijt) .
If wij∗ 6=wijt or bAz∗ − H1 (idi∗) · c∗ (modq)ed 6=bAzt − H1 (idit) · c∗ (modq)ed, then a collision in
H2 is obtained.
Therefore, wij∗=wijt , which leads to
(
idi∗ , idj∗ , wij∗
)
=
(
idit , idjt , wijt
)
(because the warrant includes
the identity information), and the entries of A (z∗ − zt)(modq) are in
[
−2d, 2d
]
.
If z∗ = zt, (idi∗ , idj∗ , wij∗ , Wi∗→j∗ = (z∗, c∗))= (idit , idjt , wijt , Wit→jt = (zt, ct)), it isn’t a
successful forgery.
If z∗ 6= zt, let e1 = z∗− zt, e2 = −A (z∗ − zt) (modq), then Ae1 + e2 = 0 (modq), and ‖e1‖∞ ≤ 2B,
‖e2‖∞ ≤ 2d. The SIS instance is solved.
Now, we know c∗ = ct comes from H2(wij) query, and invoke F again. Due to General Forking
Lemma [29], with a probability not less than(
ε1 − 1/2128
) ((
ε1 − 1/2128
)
/(Q1 + Q2) − 1/2128
)
,
we obtain a different valid delegation information (z¯, c¯) on
(
idi∗ , idj∗ , wij∗
)
, and c¯ 6= c∗.
Then, bAz∗ − H1 (idi∗) · c∗ (modq)ed = bAz¯− H1 (idi∗) · c¯ (modq)ed, which means Az∗ −
H1 (idi∗) · c∗ + e =Az¯− H1 (idi∗) · c¯ (modq) for ‖e‖∞ ≤ 2d−1. Replacing H1 (idi∗) with ASidi∗ + Eidi∗ ,
we have A
(
z∗ − z¯ + Sidi∗ (c¯− c∗)
)
+ e + Eidi∗ (c¯− c∗) = 0 (modq). Let e1 = z∗ − z¯ + Sidi∗ (c¯− c∗),
e2 = e+ Eidi∗ (c¯− c∗), then ‖e1‖∞ ≤ 2B+ 2λ1σ, ‖e2‖∞ ≤ 2d−1 + 2λ1σ. In addition, Sidi∗ and Eidi∗ have
a variety of options, F doesn’t know which pair
(
Sidi∗ , Eidi∗
)
is used to build e1 and e2. Therefore, the
probability of (e1, e2) 6= (0, 0) is at least 1/2.
5.3.2. EUF-ID-CMA Security
Theorem 2. Provided that the SIS problem is hard to solve, our identity-based proxy signature scheme with
message recovery (IDPSWM) is signature existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen message and identity
(EUF-ID-CMA).
Proof. We prove this theorem by contradiction. Assuming that a polynomial time forger F has the
ability to provide a valid and fresh proxy signature with some non-negligible probability ε2, we can
design an algorithm C to solve an SIS problem instance with probability(
1/2 − 1/2128
) (
ε2 − 1/2128
) ((
ε2 − 1/2128
)
/(Q3 + Q4) − 1/2128
)
,
where Q3 and Q4 are the times of H5 (c) queries and PSign
(
(idi, idj, wij, cij, zij),vk
)
queries.
That is to say, with an SIS problem instance (A|In) ∈ Zn×(m+n)q , C interacts with forger F to find a
small non-zero vector e =
(
e1
e2
)
, e1 ∈ Zm and e2 ∈ Zn, such that (A|In) e = (A|In)
(
e1
e2
)
= Ae1 + e2 =
0 (modq). The details are as follows:
• Initial Phase: C selects F1 : {0, 1}l2 → {0, 1}l1 , F2 : {0, 1}l1 → {0, 1}l2 , submits A, F1, and F2 as
system parameters to the forger F .
• Query Phase: The forger F makes the following queries, C gives reasonable answers:
1. H1 (idi) query: F selects a user identity idi ∈ {0, 1}∗, and sends it to C. C samples Sidi ← Dm×nσ ,
Eidi ← Dn×nσ , let H1 (idi) = ASidi + Eidi . He saves
(
idi, Sidi , ASidi + Eidi
)
in the listH1 and returns
H1(idi) = ASidi + Eidi to F .
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2. H2
(
wij
)
query: F selects warrant wij ∈ {0, 1}∗ associated with the original signer idi ∈ {0, 1}∗,
the proxy signer idj ∈ {0, 1}∗, sends all of them to C. C randomly samples cij ← {−1, 0, 1}n with
Hamming weight less than or equal to λ1, selects zij ← DmB uniformly, let ω = Azij − H1 (idi) ·
cij (modq). If some entry in ω is larger than 2d−1 − 7λ1σ, C resamples cij and zij again. Because
2d ≥ 7λ1
√
λ2nδ , the probability that every entry in ω is smaller than 2d−1 − 7λ1σ is larger than
1/3. At last, C saves (idi, idj, wij, cij, zij) in listH2 and returns cij to F .
3. H4 (y) query: F selects y← U
(
DmB
)
randomly, sends it to C. C selects c′∈ {0, 1}l1+l2 uniformly
and randomly. Then, C saves (y, bAy (modq)ed, c′) in listH4 and returns c′ to F .
4.H5 (c) query: F sends c ∈ {0, 1}l1+l2and submits it to C. C chooses c0 ← {−1, 0, 1}n with
Hamming weight less than or equal to λ1. Then, C saves (c, c0) in listH5 and returns c0 to F .
5. KeyExtract (idi) query: F selects a user identity idi ∈ {0, 1}∗ , sends it to the challenger C. C
searches list H1 to get (idi, Sidi , ASidi + Eidi ) , returns skidi = Sidi . If it doesn’t exist, C queries
H1 (idi) firstly.
6. DelGen
(
idi, idj, wij
)
query: F selects the original signer idi ∈ {0, 1}∗ , the proxy signer idj ∈
{0, 1}∗ , and the warrant wij ∈ {0, 1}∗ sends all of them to C. C looks list H2 for (idi, idj, wij, cij, zij)
and returns
(
zij, cij
)
. If (idi, idj, wij, cij, zij) doesn’t exist, C queries H2
(
wij
)
firstly.
7. PkeyGen
(
idi, idj, wij, zij, cij
)
query: F sends the delegation information (idi, idj, wij, zij, cij) to
the challenger C. C verifies its validity firstly. If it isn’t valid, he refuses to respond. Otherwise,
C executes KeyExtract (idj) query to get secret key skidj = Sidj , computes Lwij = H3 (wij, zij, cij)
and ski,j,wij = Sidj · Lwij , returns ski,j,wij to F .
8. PSign
(
(idi, idj, wij, zij, cij),vk
)
query: F submits (idi, idj, wij, zij, cij) and message vk to the
challenger C. C verifies the legality of (idi, idj, wij, zij, cij). If it is illegal, C rejects answering the
query. Otherwise, he executes PkeyGen
(
idi, idj, wij, zij, cij
)
query to get the delegated secret key
ski,j,wij , invokes algorithm PSign
(
ski,j,wij ,vk
)
to get signature ςijk =
(
zijk, cijk
)
, and returns it
to F .
• Forge Phase: The forger F gives his forgery signature (idi∗ , idj∗ , wij∗ , z∗, c∗, zv∗ , cv∗) for
message v∗.
C invokes F again. Due to General Forking Lemma [29], with probability(
ε2 − 1/2128
) ((
ε2 − 1/2128
)
/(Q3 + Q4) − 1/2128
)
, we obtain a new signature
(idi∗ , idj∗ , wij∗ , z∗, c∗, z′v∗ , c′v∗) for message v∗, such that
bAzv∗ − H1
(
idj∗
) · Lwij∗ · H5 (cv∗) (modq)ed
is equivalent to
bAz′v∗ − H1
(
idj∗
) · Lwij∗ · H5 (c′v∗) (modq)ed
and H5 (c′v∗) 6= H5 (cv∗).
Then, Azv∗ − H1
(
idj∗
) · Lwij∗ · H5 (cv∗) + eˆ=Az′v∗ − H1 (idj∗) · Lwij∗ · H5 (c′v∗) (modq)
for ‖eˆ‖∞ ≤ 2d−1. Replacing H1
(
idj∗
)
with ASidj∗ + Eidj∗ , we have
A
(
zv∗ − z′v∗ + Sidj∗ · Lwij∗ (H5 (c′v∗)− H5 (cv∗))
)
+ eˆ + Eidj∗ (H5 (c
′
v∗)− H5 (cv∗)) =
0 (modq). Let e1 = zv∗ − z′v∗ + Sidj∗ · Lwij∗ (H5 (c′v∗)− H5 (cv∗)), e2 = eˆ +
Eidj∗ (H5 (c
′
v∗)− H5 (cv∗)), then ‖e1‖∞ ≤ 2B + 2λ1
√
λ2σ, ‖e2‖∞ ≤ 2d−1 + 2λ1σ. In addition,
Sidi∗ and Eidi∗ have a variety of options, F doesn’t know which pair
(
Sidj∗ , Eidj∗
)
is used to build
e1 and e2. Therefore, the probability of (e1, e2) 6= (0, 0) is at least 1/2.
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5.4. Performance Analysis
Regarding the performance analysis, we will focus on the following three aspects: signature
compression, signing right delegation and message recovery.
Firstly, we take the signature compression technique from [22]. For hash value H1 (id) for user
id, we first sample Eid ← Dn×nσ such that |Eid (i, j)| ≤ 7σ for all i, j = 1, · · · , n. Then, we invoke
algorithm Sid ← SamplePre (A, T, H1 (id)− Eid, σ) such that ASid + Eid = H1 (id). We set Sid rather
than (Sid, Eid), as the private key of user id. The abandoned Eid leads to the signature length reducing
from (Sidc + y, Eidc + y) to Sidc + y, which is about n log
(
14σ (m− 1)
√
λ1
√
λ2
)
bits. Combining the
operation baed = (a− [a]2d)/2d, the discarded Eidc+ y does not affect signature verification algorithm.
For signing right delegation, we make the original signer’s signature (zw, cw) for the warrant
w public for everyone. Any verifier can take (w, zw, cw) to verify the original signer’s signing right
transfer to the proxy signer. Besides doing the same operations with the verifier, the proxy signer
must embed (w, zw, cw) into the generation of proxy signature private key—the delegated secret key.
Therefore, the delegated secret key is decided by the original signer and the proxy signer. The original
signer can’t deny his authorization to the proxy signer, can’t generate the delegated secret key alone,
so that proxy signer’s interests are protected. On the other hand, the proxy signer can’t generate the
delegated secret key without the permission of the original signer, thus the interests of the original
signer are protected. In addition, no secure channel is necessary between the original signer and proxy
signer—because no secret information is transmitted between them.
Thirdly, we use the idea of message recovery signature in [23], hide the message v in the signature,
and the message v can be recovered without any secret information, hence only the signature should
be transmitted and everyone can verify its legality.
In Table 1, we give the performance comparison between [23] and our scheme. Two schemes
are both with message recovery and quantum resistance, and the number of signature verification
operations is the same. The differences between two schemes are shown in the following aspects:
firstly, the scheme in [23] needs the support of public key infrastructure while our scheme does not
need it. Public key infrastructure provides security assurance of the relationship between public key
and private key, which is achieved by authoritative authority signing certificates for users. Therefore,
public key infrastructure needs to complete certificate allocation, verification, storage and revocation
operations, which requires a large amount of bandwidth resources and computing resources. In
our scheme, the public key is the user’s identity, and the relationship between the public key and
the private key is natural. Therefore, we no longer need the support of the complex public key
infrastructure, and the system becomes concise. Secondly, the scheme in [23] does not have the
function of proxy authorization, and our scheme has this function. Therefore, our scheme is more
powerful. In addition, the scheme in [23] does not introduce signature compression technology, and
our scheme introduces signature compression technology to make the signature length shorter. It
is clear that our scheme has better functionality compared to the scheme in [23]. However, because
we take the signature compression technique from [22] to condense signature length, it is necessary
to ensure
∣∣∣[ω(i)]2d ∣∣∣ ≤ 2d−1 − 7λ1√λ2σ. To this end, we repeat operations of signing message with
probability not larger than 2/3—this is our scheme’s extra computation cost. For every operation
of signing message and verification, our scheme’s computation cost is comparable with that of the
scheme in [23].
The lattice-based proxy signature scheme with message recovery in [25] follows the same frame
with the scheme in [23] and ours; we also include it in Table 1. Compared with our scheme, the scheme
in [25] bases on public key infrastructure, delegation of signature right depends on secure channel and
can’t be verified publicly. In addition, the scheme in [25] doesn’t take signature compression technique,
its signature is longer and the number of signature operations is small. According to [30], reduction in
message length will reduce energy consumption to a greater extent than reduction in computation.
Overall, our scheme is more efficient.
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Table 1. Performance comparison among Refs. [23] and [25] and our scheme.
[23] [25] Ours
Public key infrastructure Need Need Not need
Delegation of signature right No Yes Yes
Signature compression No No Yes
Message recovery Yes Yes Yes
Quantum resistance Yes Yes Yes
Signature operation 1 time 1 time 5/3 time
Verification operation 1 time 1 time 1 time
6. Conclusions
In this paper, we first proposed the identity-based proxy signature scheme with message recovery
based on the lattice assumptions. In particular, we used the signature compression technique for lattice
signature without trapdoors to decrease signature length. We abandoned the secure channel between
original signer and proxy signer and made the model possess better environmental adaptability. We
also divided the security definition into two factors, making the security analysis much easier to
be understood. We introduced the idea of message recovery signature, embedding messages into
signatures and shortening the amount of information to be transmitted. For security analysis, our
scheme is based on the learning with errors and the small integer solution problems. Finally, we
demonstrated our performance via comparison with some related works.
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